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ment. Using data on theUnitedKingdomover the last three hundred years, the paper identifies supply, aggregate
demand and residual shocks to energy prices and estimates their changing influence on energy prices and GDP.
The results suggest that the impacts of supply shocks rose with its increasing dependence on coal, and declined
with its partial transition to oil. However, the transition from exporting coal to importing oil increased the
negative impacts of demand shocks. More generally, the results indicate that improvements in vulnerability
and resilience to shocks did not progress systematically as the economy developed. Instead, the changes in
impacts depended greatly on the circumstances related to the demand for and supply of energy sources. If
these experiences are transferable to futuremarkets, a transition to a diversifiedmix of renewable energy is likely
to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to energy price shocks.
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An economy's long run growth and development is highly depen-
dent on its vulnerability and resilience to shocks (Balassa, 1986,
Romer and Romer, 2004, Martin, 2012). Oil shocks have been seen as
one of the main dampeners of economic growth since the Second
World War. Especially since the 1970s oil crises, economists have
sought to identify their effects on the economy (Hamilton, 1983,
Kilian, 2008).
Early on in the debate, Nordhaus (1980a, 1980b) outlined some of
the key avenues through which oil prices can constrain the economy1.
A rising oil price increases energy expenditure (when theprice elasticitytz, Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Lutz
ents. In addition, we would like
ponsibility. We also gratefully
Growth Initiative (GGGI), the
or Climate Change (BC3) and
influencing economic growth,
009), Stern and Kander (2012).
B.V. This is an open access article uof demand is low) which drives-up the price of goods produced and
reduces goods consumed, thus, harming GDP, as well as harming the
balance of payments (when oil is imported) and generating inflationary
pressures. Hamilton (1983) estimated a statistically significant relation-
ship between oil price hikes and economic recessions between 1948
and 1981. More recently, Kilian (2009) showed that the source (i.e.
supply- or demand-driven) of an oil price hike is crucial to its impact
on output and inflation. Despite major progress in our understanding
of the macroeconomic impacts of oil shocks, most lessons from related
studies tend to be limited to evidence gathered from short-run national
or cross-sectional studies.
Instead, onemight be interested to knowwhether individual econo-
mies have become less vulnerable to (i.e., the immediate impact) and
more resilient from (i.e., the ability to bounce back) energy price shocks
through time and as they have developed. For instance, one might
expect that economic development – such as, the shift from an agrarian
to an industrial to a knowledge economy – is enabling nations to
become more capable of absorbing shocks. This might be because of a
declining share of energy in production, more flexible labour markets
or better monetary policies (Blanchard and Galí, 2010). Dhawan and
Jeske (2006) found that, since 1986, developed economies have become
less vulnerable to oil shocks. While some studies have focused on the
impact in developing economies (Schubert and Turnovsky, 2011),nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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World War period in mature industrialized economies.2
To extend our understanding of a possible tendency towards declin-
ing vulnerability and possibly greater resilience, the primary purpose of
this paper is to estimate the changing impacts of energy price shocks in
the United Kingdom over the last three hundred years, and at different
phases of economic development. It uses the rich data available for the
United Kingdom on economic growth and energy prices (such as
Broadberry et al., 2015 and Fouquet, 2011) to estimate the changing re-
lationship. Thus, the main contributions of this paper to the literature
are, first, to place current empirical evidence of declining impacts of
oil shocks within a much broader historical context and, second, to
assess what factors influence long run changes in the impacts of energy
price shocks.
The results indicate that the impacts of shocks did not progress sys-
tematically as the British economy developed. Instead, the changes in
impacts depended greatly on the circumstances related to the demand
for and supply of energy sources — although energy markets may
have been affected by the changing structure and energy intensity of
the economy. At first, the transition from biomass to coal reduced the
economy's vulnerability to supply shocks, increased its resilience to
them, and led to greater gains from demand shocks, especially as coal
was increasingly exported. However, by the early twentieth century,
the economy's heavy dependence on coal made it highly sensitive to
supply shocks. The partial transition to oil (and generally broader fuel
mix) reduced the economy's immediate impacts of supply shocks, but
also weakened its lagged response to these shocks and increased the
negative impacts of demand shocks. Thus, energy markets, rather than
levels of economic development, appear to be a key determinant of
the effects of energy price shocks on the economy.
Given that the economy's increasing dependence on oil has been rel-
atively recent compared to the dependence on coal and biomass,3 this
study considers energy more broadly. This broader perspective is also
valuable given that the fuel mix in many economies is shifting towards
natural gas and most recently renewable energy sources. Thus, a focus
on oil at the expense of other energy sources might limit the value of
these recent studies to interpret the vulnerability and resilience of fu-
ture economies to natural gas (or even renewable energy-related)
price hikes.
The following section reviews the literature on the impact of energy
shocks on economic activity since the SecondWorldWar. The third sec-
tion outlines the data used for this analysis. The fourth section explains
the methodology used, based initially on Kilian (2008), and identifies
the sources and size of the energy shocks over the last three hundred
years. The subsequent section presents the evidence on how the impact
of these shocks has changed over that time. The final section tries to
draw the lessons from this historical experience for developing and de-
veloped economies.
2. The impact of oil prices shocks on the economy since 1948
The literature boomon the influence of oil prices on GDPwas initiat-
ed by Hamilton (1983), who intended to measure the impact of oil
prices on US macro-economic aggregates. Treating the oil price as an
exogeneous variable, he found that oil prices had a significant impact
on US GDP. Although Darby (1982) could not consistently confirm this
negative impact of oil prices on GDP by testing the impact of the
1973–74 oil price shock on eight industrialized economies, several
later studies that included the 1979–80 oil price shock confirmed
Hamilton's (1983) finding. Burbridge and Harrison (1984), Gisser and
Goodwin (1986), Mork (1989), Mork et al. (1994), Lee et al (1995),2 Huntington (2017) investigates the impact of energy price shocks before the Second
World War in the US.
3 The British economy was mainly dependent (over 50% of energy expenditures) on
biomass until 1820, on coal from 1820 to 1950 and on oil from the 1950s onwards.Ferderer (1996), Papapetrou (2001), Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez
(2005), Lardic and Mignon (2006) and Cunado and de Gracia (2005)
found consistent negative impacts of oil prices on GDP for industrial-
ized, industrializing, oil importing and oil exporting economies. Also,
the effects seem to be surprisingly similar across developed countries.
Most studies concluded that the impact of oil prices on GDP declined
strongly over time. Hamilton (1983, 1996) found a significant higher
impact coefficient for the period 1948–1973 compared with the period
after that. Blanchard and Galí (2010) found a reduced impact coefficient
in the early 1980s, while Kilian (2008) and Baumeister and Peersman
(2013a, 2013b) identified a strong decline in impact coefficients of oil
prices on GDP in the mid-1980s. While Hamilton (1996) suggests that
the reason for this declining impact is thehigher level of overall inflation
during the 1973–1980 period and rejects the idea that a structural break
has taken place, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Baumeister and
Peersman (2013b) and Kilian (2008) propose the existence of a struc-
tural break in the oil-GDP effect during the 1980s. Proposed explana-
tions for this possible ‘structural break’ of the oil-GDP effect are the
declining share of oil expenditures in GDP, decliningwage ridigities, im-
proved response of monetary policy (Blanchard and Galí, 2010;
Bernanke, 2004), the sectoral composition of GDP (Maravalle, 2012),
the terms of trade balance (Maravalle, 2013), differences in overall
macroeconomic uncertainty (Robays, 2012), or a change in the origins
behind an oil price surge (Kilian, 2008, 2009, Kilian and Murphy, 2012,
2014).
By looking at the different drivers of oil price surges, Kilian (2008)
offered a new approach and stimulated a new line of research in the
oil-GDP debate.While earlierwork regarded oil price shocks to be exog-
enous and the result of supply distractions, Barsky and Kilian (2004)
challenge this perception. Instead, Kilian (2008, 2009) proposed a
three-variable endogenous model including oil production, real eco-
nomic activity (using a business cycle indicator) and oil prices to disen-
tangle three different shocks that could have an impact on oil prices:
• crude oil supply shocks (due to global oil production);
• aggregate demand shocks (for industrial commodities in the global
market);
• oil-market specific demand shocks (that are specific to the global
crude oil market, usually based on fear of future events that might
cause oil prices to change; they are also known as precautionary de-
mand or residual shocks).
Although several different approaches of this breakdown have been
proposed in recent papers (e.g., Lutkepohl and Netsujanev, 2012;
Melolinna, 2012), the original breakdown proposed and continuously
improved by Kilian (2008, 2009), Kilian and Murphy (2012, 2014),
Inoue and Kilian (2013) and Kilian and Lee (2014) remains the domi-
nant approach to decompose oil shocks. His conclusions are that while
oil prices are affected considerably by aggregate demand and specula-
tive demand effects, the effects of supply shocks on oil prices are rela-
tively low. The effects of supply shocks are predominantly disruptive
for GDP during the first year after the shock, while oil-specific demand
shocks and (highly significant) aggregate demand shocks are more dis-
ruptive for GDP after about two years. Aggregate demand shocks actual-
ly improve GDP during the first year as the positive effects on GDP offset
the ensuing negative effects of the oil price increase. Kilian (2008) esti-
mated the cumulative effect of oil supply shocks on oil prices since 1975
to be much smaller than those of aggregate and oil-specific demand
shocks, rejecting Hamilton's (2003) conclusions and invalidating his as-
sumption that oil price variations are exogenous.
The conclusion that the 2002–2008 oil price surge had been caused
by aggregate demand rather than supply effects explainswhy it was un-
explained by earlier research which performed a direct VAR (vector
autoregressive) regression of oil prices on GDP. Hence, as it is likely
that worldwide aggregate demand had a positive impact on both oil
prices and GDP, a regression between the two would not capture the
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Furthermore, Kilian and Murphy (2014) and Hamilton (2009) found
that price speculation also played a role in the 2002–2008 oil price
surge.
Nearly all the literature came to the conclusion that the effect of an
oil price increase on GDP has been significantly larger thanwould be ex-
pected given the share of oil expenditures in GDP. Economic theory has
long struggled to explain this finding (Rotemberg andWoodford, 1996,
Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999, Finn, 2000). Therefore, in parallel with the
discussion about whether and to what extend oil prices have affected
GDP, the channels of transmission regarding this causality have been in-
vestigated. Kilian (2008) identifies four different transmission mecha-
nisms through which an increase in energy prices might affect GDP.
We can roughly divide these four effects in two categories.
The first category has to do with the actual function of energy in the
economy. These effects are likely to be symmetric in response to varia-
tion of energy prices, as they are relevant for both energy price increases
and decreases. First, there is an operating cost effect: for durables that
use oil as an energy input, their demand and usage is dependent on
the operating costs defined by the price of oil (see Hamilton, 1988).
There is also a discretionary income effect: as demand for most energy
services nowadays is expected to be inelastic, changes in energy prices
will have an effect on total incomewith consequences for consumption
of other goods. Based on these effects, Finn (2000) found that energy
price shocks, which can be considered as adverse technology shocks,
could hypothetically cause GDP to decrease by more than twice the
amount that would be expected given the energy share in GDP. Using
Swedish GDP and energy data for the period 1800–2000, Stern and
Kander (2012) concluded that whenever energy became scarce
(hence, energy prices increased), the response of GDP relative to the
share of energy expenditures in GDP was stronger than when energy
was abundant (hence, cheap).
The second category consists of effects that have to do with human
behaviour and expectations. Therefore, catching these effects in conven-
tional economic models is more complicated and an asymmetric re-
sponse of GDP to energy price variation is likely, as these effects are
expected to be stronger in relation to energy price increases compared
with energy price decreases. First, an uncertainty effect is associated
with changing energy prices that may create uncertainty about the fu-
ture path of the price of energy, causing consumers and producers to
postpone irreversible investments (Bernanke, 1983, Pindyck, 1999).
Furthermore, the precautionary savings effect is in response to an ener-
gy price increase, as consumers might smooth their consumption be-
cause they perceive a greater likelihood of future unemployment and
the resulting income losses. Conclusions on an asymmetric response
of GDP to oil prices (Mork, 1989, 1994; Mory, 1993; Lee et al., 1995;
Hamilton, 1996, 2003) would suggest that the uncertainty effect is the
dominant effect in the observations regarding the oil-GDP relationship,
since this effect is based on the decline in investments as a result of en-
ergy price volatility in general rather than just energy price increases.
Guo and Kliesen (2005) and Rentschler (2013) confirm the direct neg-
ative impact of oil price volatility on GDP in several countries.
As the discussion in this section shows so far, there is a lot of empir-
ical literature on the impact of oil prices on GDP. Most of this literature
however focuses on the last couple of decades. Since the purpose of this
study is to estimate the impact of energy prices on British GDP since
1700, it is important to carefully choose the appropriate methodology
for this task.
Especially in the last decade, economists have increasingly used his-
torical or long run evidence in energy markets to provide insights that
may be absent in contemporary data. For instance, many have focussed
on energy transitions and the diffusion of technologies (Ray, 1983,
Grübler et al., 1999; Gales et al., 2007, Batoletto and Rubio, 2008,
Fouquet, 2008, Fouquet, 2010, Rubio and Folchi, 2012, Kander et al.,
2013, Grubler and Wilson, 2014, Fouquet, 2016). A few have looked at
long run fluctuations associated with resource abundance and scarcityreflected in energy prices (Hausman, 1996, Pindyck, 1999, Cashin and
McDermott, 2002, Fouquet and Pearson, 2003, Fouquet, 2011, Muller,
2016). Some have investigated energy and energy service consumption
patterns (Fouquet and Pearson, 1998, 2006, 2012, Fouquet, 2008, 2014).
Others have looked at the important link between energy use and eco-
nomic growth (Humphrey and Stanislaw, 1979, Ray, 1983, Ayres and
Warr, 2005, Stern and Kander, 2012, Kander et al., 2013). These studies
offer new approaches and new data sets for energy economists to ex-
ploit. They also raise questions about the external validity of these stud-
ies, and the lessons that can be learnt from them for understanding
future behaviour and formulating policy. In particular, they highlight
the need for theory to act as a bridge between historical experiences
and relevant lessons.
While many of these studies are descriptive, a few offer analytical
models and techniques that should be considered in the context of the
current paper. Stern and Kander (2012) and Ayres and Warr (2005)
build theoretical models in order to estimate the contribution of energy
services to long run economic growth. Fouquet (2014) uses a VECM
(vector error correcting) model to explore the long-term development
of income and price elasticities, whereas Pindyck (1999) and Cashin
and Mcdermott (2002) employ stochastic models in order to detect
trends in the long run evolution of energy prices. None of thesemethods
are, however, suitable to measure the impact of endogenously related
stochastic variables, such as energy prices and GDP growth. More re-
cently, however, VAR models have been applied to analyse long-term
stochastic data (Rathke and Sarferaz, 2010; Stuermer, 2016). The bene-
fit of the VARmethod is that the user only has to prescribe the assump-
tions to identify shocks in the variables of the model and can be
ambivalent or agnostic of the long-run causality of the relationship.
This is important for the purpose of this study, given the endogeneity
of the relationship between energy prices and GDP.
In an attempt to analyse the effects of energy prices on the long term,
this paper therefore applies themethod of separating price changes pre-
sented in Kilian andMurphy (2012) to British annual energy prices dur-
ing for the period 1700–2010 to identify supply, demand and residual
price shocks over time. As a next step and following Kilian (2008), we
test the impact of these identified shocks on British GDP during the
same period. We chose to apply this breakdown of the analysis in two
phases over using a TVP-VAR model as in Baumeister and Peersman
(2013a). The major reason for this choice is the possibility to explicitly
review the identified shocks before continuing with their time-
dependent impact on GDP. This intermediate result is not only an inter-
esting output of the model, but it is also essential to check whether the
identified shocks correspond with historical events in order to confirm
whether the identification process makes sense. To take into account
the potential time-varying relationship between the input variables,
we applied a simplified modification to the identification process,
which is further explained in Section 4. But before reviewing the meth-
od used, the next section will go into detail about the data used for this
approach.
3. Data
To study the historical impact of United Kingdom energy prices on
economic activity at different phases of economic development, it is
necessary to gather statistical information on different energy prices
and GDP for the period 1700–2008, as well as indicators for supply
and demand in the energy market in order to reproduce Kilian's
(2009) breakdown of oil price changes. The following is a summary of
the sources and methods - more detail of the sources can be found in
Fouquet (2008, 2011).
It is important to note that we focus on a wide set of commodities
that contribute to the provision of energy services. These include prov-
ender (i.e., fodder for horses),wood, coal, petroleumand natural gas. Al-
though food contributed significantly to the provision of power in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century economy (up to 28% of power and
Coal
Source: Broadberry et al (2013), Fouquet (2011) 
Provender
Oil
Gas
GDP per 
capita
Fig. 1. United Kingdom energy prices and GDP per capita (1700–2010).
6 Apart from a few years with strong coal production cuts, when the total effect of these
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we did not include it in this analysis as demand for food (and, therefore,
its price) is driven by much more than just its calorific value.
United Kingdom GDP is based on pulling together data from
Broadberry et al. (2015), Mitchell (1988) and ONS (2010). The consum-
er price index data available from Allen (2007) enables GDP and prices
to be broadly comparable across time and expressed in real terms for
the year 2000. The price data, and indiciators of supply and demand
will be presented in the following three sub-sections.
3.1. Price data
The price series are based on residential UK energy prices from a
variety of data sources (Fouquet, 2011) and can be seen in Fig. 1,
along with trends in GDP. To replicate the price series in the oil price-
GDP literature, however, we create an aggregate energy price series.
To calculate the series, we created indices for the energy prices of each
different end-use service4 and weighted them using the expenditures
on energy of every service.
After this step, we followed Kilian's (2008) approach, weighting the
prices by the share of total energy expenditures in total GDP. This
creates an index series that represents the accumulation of
expenditure-weighted changes in energy prices over time. Since we
want to measure the economic effects of energy price ‘shocks’ in this
paper, we are interested in the annual variation rather than the trend
in these price index series.
3.2. Production data
The supply index series in this paper is constructed using a variety of
sources for each different energy type. The different energy types are
weighted by their relative share of total energy expenditures. The
expenditures are calculated by multiplying consumption with the 10-
year moving averages5 of the prices of each type of energy. We are
interested in production statistics of relevance for UK energy supply.
Therefore, it can differ between energy sources and between periods
whether we use national or international production statistics, depend-
ing on whether we are looking at locally or globally traded energy
commodities.
3.2.1. Provender for working animals
Consumption of provender (i.e., fodder for horses) can easily be es-
timated using working horse population estimates. However, produc-
tion data is harder to obtain. Due to extensive documentation by
Broadberry et al. (2015), it was possible to obtain an annual estimate
for agricultural production in Great Britain for the period 1700–1870.
In their data, they report an estimate of agricultural GDP in which price
variation is filtered out. Using this index, it was implicitly assumed that
the production trend is similar for Northern Ireland and that on average,
variation in the annual production and price estimates is equally spread
between the food and provender sector. For the period after 1870, pro-
duction growth data is extrapolated. However, the share of provender
in the total energy mix had already lost most of its significance by
1870. Provender imports are not taken into account, as these were not
very significant until 1870.
3.2.2. Woodfuel
For simplicity, we keep woodfuel production equal to wood con-
sumption over the whole period. Since woodfuel production has not
been very significant in the British energy mix since 1700, the4 As we divide the energy prices indices by the service end-use, we measure the prices
paid by final users (after taxes) and thus not the prices of primary energy.
5 Ten-year moving averages were used in the calculation of energy expenditures to re-
move most of the influence of price volatility in the weighting procedure.assumption that woodfuel demand was met might be quite realistic
for the UK. Consumption data is obtained from Fouquet (2008).
3.2.3. Coal
For the period until 1981,we only use the sumof coal production es-
timates within the UK and coal imports into the UK. The latter were
however limited until the 1980s6. Even though coal is an internationally
tradable commodity, accurate world coal production estimates are ab-
sent for the pre-1981 period. Also, the UK was a net exporter of coal
until 1984, so mainly homeland production was relevant for British
coal supply until the 1980s. For the period after 1981, world coal pro-
duction estimates are used as the worldwidemarket became important
for UK supply purposes. This data is obtained from the BP (2011) Statis-
tical Review.
3.2.4. Petroleum
For the complete time series, we used the world oil production data
from the JODI database7. Doing this, we assume that since oil is a rela-
tively easy-to-transport energy source, world oil production is relevant
for the UK.
3.2.5. Natural gas
Until 1970, nearly all gas consumed in the UK was obtained from
coal in the form of ‘town gas’. Since the production of town gas from
coal is an industrial process, we use coal production as a proxy for
town gas production.8 From 1970 onwards, however, when natural
gas use increasingly replaced town gas use in the UK,we use the natural
gas production estimates of the UK for the share of natural gas in the
total gas mix (100% from 1976 onwards). For most of the period since
1970, the UK was nearly producing all its natural gas within its borders.
The data on natural gas production in the UK are again obtained from
the BP (2011) Statistical Review.
3.3. Economic activity data
The most important feature of the indicator for economic activity
should be that it shows the ups and downs of the business cycle. Follow-
ing Baumeister and Peersman (2013a) whose research objective comes
close to the one of this paper, we decided to use a mix of GDP data forcuts were partly offset by increased imports.
7 Available at http://www.jodidata.org/.
8 We only use production estimates of primary energy commodities and not intermedi-
ate energy commodities in order avoid estimation errors due to interdependence of differ-
ent energy commodities in our energy production index.
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Hodrick-Prescott Filter (using λ= 100, following Backus and Kehoe,
1992) to filter out the business cycle from this GDP data.
By usingGDPdata as an indicator of economic activity,wedo not fol-
low Kilian (2008, 2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2012), who use a
transformation of worldwide dry cargo shipping rates as an indicator
for economic activity. Their reasoning for using shipping rates is that
since the supply of shipping is relatively flat when demand for shipping
is low and very steepwhen demand for shipping is high, the variance in
the price of shipping is a good indicator for the worldwide business cy-
cles. They argue that using national GDP or industrial production data
would require a complex weighting procedure between different coun-
tries in order to create a global index that correctly represents the evo-
lution in relevant economic activity. Although shipping rates are
available for the full period of interest for this study (1700–2010), we
do not adopt these as our indicator for real activity for two main rea-
sons: there may exist a reverse causality of energy prices on shipping
rates for which this relationship cannot assumed to be non-positive
for annual data back to 170010 and shipping rates have historically
been heavily influenced by factors other than economic activity, such
as increased risk premiums durings wars.
Given the choice of GDP as an indicator of economic activity, it is im-
portant to take the spatial relevance of economic activity to UK energy
prices into account in order to create an index that correctly represents
the evolution in relevant economic activity. For example, economic activ-
ity in China had essentially zero impact on UK provender prices in 1700,
whereas they had a major impact on UK petroleum prices in 2010. For
that reason, we used five different gross demand indicators, dependent
on the relevant region for a certain energy commodity during a certain
period. The five regions and their assumed relevance to energy demand
(influencing energy prices in the UK) are given in Table 1. Most of the
splits in the data between regions are already clarified above in the sup-
ply data. Besides these clarifications, we used a real activity indicator for
Europe and Western offshoots together for the oil part until 1965, since
an oil-consuming world indicator could only be constructed from 1965
onwards and the big majority of oil demand came from Europe and
North-America before 1965. Taking the business cycle series of these
five regions together - weighted correctly on the relevant energy com-
modities consumed in the UK - a final business cycle indicatorwas creat-
ed, reflecting relevant economic activity for the UK energy market.4. The shock analysis
As explained in the introduction, we will use our data to distinguish
shocks in the supply of energy, shocks in aggregate demand for com-
modities and shocks in the price of energy not explained by either sup-
ply or aggregate demand shocks. In making this distinction, we can test
the correlation between these resulting shocks on other variables like
energy prices and GDP.4.1. Methodology to identify shocks
The first step in our approach was to define all the supply, demand
and residual shocks through the analysed period from 1700 to 2010.
The method used for disentangling these shocks is similar to that of
Kilian and Murphy (2012), but with one important difference to make
the method more appropriate for long-term data.9 The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.
htm, 2013 version.
10 Kolodzeij and Kaufmann (2014) suggest that the impact of oil prices on shipping rates
can also not be assumed to be non-positive for Kilian's (2009) data (1975–2007), but
Kilian suggests that the contemporaneous correlation between bunker shipping rates
and bunker fuel is essentially zero and therefore assumes that shipping rates do not corre-
spond to changes in oil prices within the same month.First, we consider a fully structural oil market VARmodel of the form
yt ¼ α þ
X2
i¼1Biyt− j þ et
where et is a vector of residuals and yt = (Δprodt, Δreat, Δrpet) con-
tains annual data on the percent change in energy production (prodt),
the index of real economic activity representing the relevant business
cycle (reat) and the percent change in real energy prices (rpet). We
use Ω, the variance–covariance matrix of et, to identify how the struc-
turally independent changes to the model depend on each other. Since
we are looking at shocks over 310 years and, therefore, aware that
these relationships between changes (i.e., the residuals of the VAR
model including energy production, economic activity and energy
prices) develop over time, we use a moving average (rather than a sin-
gle matrix as is traditionally done for short run analysis) to orthogonal-
izeΩ and identify the shockmatrix Pk, such thatΩk=Pk'Pk and et+n =
Pkεt+n.
etþn ≡
eΔprodtþn
ereatþn
eΔrpetþn
0
B@
1
CA ¼
pk11 pk12 pk13
pk21 pk22 pk23
pk31 pk32 pk33
2
4
3
5
ε supply−shocktþn
εdemand−shocktþn
εresidual−shocktþn
0
B@
1
CA
Here, n describes the number of years in the moving average and k
identifies a set of years t + n for which a separate shock matrix Pk is
identified. The vector εt consists of a supply shock, a shock to aggregate
demand in the economy and a residual shock to energy prices not ex-
plained by variation in supply or demand, which we call the residual
shock.
In his initial version of the model, Kilian (2008, 2009) fixes the values
of b12, b13 and b23 to zero, as he postulates a vertical short-run supply
curve for crude oil. In other words, he assumes that oil supply do not re-
spond to aggregate demand and oil price changes and also that real activ-
ity cannot respond to oil price changeswithin onemonth. Although these
assumptions are reasonable on a monthly basis, they are not realistic for
annual data. That is why we used the method described in Kilian and
Murphy (2012). Instead of fixing b12, b13 and b23 to zero, a method of
sign-identification is introduced to identify supply, demand and residual
shocks based on logical economic reasoning. In addition, Kilian and
Murphy (2012) imposed bounds on the oil supply elasticity to limit the
amount of resulting admissible models, based on historically observed
maximum values of these (monthly) elasticities.
Table 2 gives the sign-identification scheme that we used to identify
energy supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and residual shocks in
our analysis. These sign restrictions are based on assumptions on the
movements of the different variables as a response to the three different
shocks. Thus, an energy supply shock is identified if, over the year, ener-
gy production declines and energy prices increase. For this shock, the
sign of changes in real activity does not matter. An aggregate demand
shock is identified if during one year real activity increases and energy
prices increase aswell. Hence we are agnostic about the sign of changes
in energy production in the identification of aggregate demand shocks.
Since we assume that residual shocks are shocks in the price of energy
that are not the result of declines in energy production or increases in
real activity, we identify themwhen energy prices increase, real activity
decreases and energy production increases during the same year. In
other words, these shocks measure increases in energy prices that are
not explainable by the model.
These restrictions do not identify the shocks uniquely, but result in a
large set of admissible shockmatrices. Tominimize the level of uncertain-
ty regarding the actual shockmatrix, themain task is to limit the number
of admissiblematrices based on theoretical expectations. Therefore,when
using the sign identificationmatrix in Table 2, we also impose restrictions
on the levels of supply elasticity related to changes in energy prices, as
done by Kilian andMurphy (2012). Sincewe areworkingwith annual in-
stead of monthly data, our boundaries cannot be too restrictive. Thus, we
Table 1
Split of demand data into different regions by relevance for UK consumption.
Regions:
Energy:
UK Europe Europe + Western offshoots1 Oil-consuming world Coal-consuming world
Provender and Wood Full period – – –
Coal Until 1983 Until 1983, for export share From 1983 onwards
Petroleum Until 1965 From 1965 onwards
Natural gas Full period
Source: see text.
1 Western offshoots include: USA, Canada, Australia and New-Zealand. The term stems from the source data (The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/
home.htm) that we use for these GDP estimates.
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/ ΔPrice b1) in response to energy price shocks.11
Finally, we calculated our identification matrices based on a moving
average of 60 years (n = 60). We chose sixty years to balance-out
higher flexibility in the results and lower levels of uncertainty. For
each period k, all the resulting admissible matrices are theoretically
equally viable. However, imposing stronger restrictions narrows down
the set of admissible matrices. Ultimately, we want to determine only
one shockmatrix per set ofmoving-average time series in order to iden-
tify a unique set of shocks per period. This unique shockmatrix is select-
ed by finding the closest-to-median matrix.12
Since the method above, introduced by Kilian (2008, 2009) and de-
veloped in Kilian and Murphy (2012), is initially designed for analysing
monthly data, theremight be doubts about the robustness of our results
on annual data. There can be a situation in which energy prices increase
simultaneously with a decrease in energy production, while the actual
cause of the energy price increase is not the decrease in production. In
such a situation, an energy supply shock is identified, while it might
be a coincidence. As Lutkepohl and Netsunajev (2012) point out, there
may be an omitted variables problem if only those variables are includ-
ed in the empirical model that are described in the theoretical model.
The chance that an identified shock is based on a coincidence is not ab-
sent with monthly data, but bigger with annual data. Thus, this is a lim-
itation of all studies using this approach, and kept in mind when
analysing the results.Table 2
Sign restriction from impulse responses.
Energy supply Aggregate demand Residual4.2. Overview of shocks
Average shock values for every year can be calculated as an interme-
diate result. Here, the shock value of a particular year represents themov-
ing average (i.e., the average of the estimated shock values of that year
identified by all shock matrices valid for that year). An overview of
these supply, aggregate demand and residual shocks can be seen in Fig. 2.
There has been a distinct evolution in the nature of supply shocks.
From 1700 to 1820, there was roughly one major shock (i.e., near or
below minus two) per decade. The transition away from biomass to-
wards coal (see Fig. 3) ushered in a period of stable supply (with less
frequent and, on average, weaker shocks in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries). However, by the end of the nineteenth century, a series
of very strong supply shocks were experienced. The post-Second
WorldWar era was one of supply stability interrupted only by one peri-
od of distinct supply shocks — between 1980 and 1984.
Since an aggregate indicator is used, the supply of energy is depen-
dent on the weighted growth rates of each source of energy used.
Over the last three centuries, different energy sources have dominated
at different times (Fouquet, 2008). Fig. 3 shows the distribution of
total expenditures on primary energy sources in theUK since 1700. Dur-
ing the eighteenth century, provender was the dominant source of11 Further details on the method and the admissible shock matrices over time can be
found in Appendix A. We would like to thank Danny Quah for this advice regarding this
method.
12 For the resulting shock matrix, most of the entry values were statistically significant
over time. For more details on the selected matrices over time, see Appendix A.energy for power. With the diffusion of steam engines, coal became
the main source of power during the nineteenth century. Coal had al-
ready become the main source for residential heating by 1700, and
then for iron production by the end of the eighteenth century. In the
twentieth century, oil became dominant for transportation and more
recently natural gas for heating. Therefore, energy supply shocks are
usually caused by a shock in the supply industry of the most dominant
energy source. This has tended to create three different types of supply
shocks. Table 3 provides an overview of all supply shocks of two stan-
dard deviations (ormore) groupedby their probable cause - the average
shock consisted of 0.75 standard deviations. Two well-known shocks
(the oil crisis of 1973–4 and the coalminers' strike of 1984) are included
in italics, because they were below two standard deviations.
In the eighteenth century, agricultural factors like crop failures had
an important impact on provender supply and, therefore, on total ‘ener-
gy’ supply. During that century, three of these events generated major
supply shocks (Broadberry et al., 2015). As the energy market changed,
so did the events causing supply disruptions. Since most of the British
economy was dependent on coal by the end of the nineteenth century,
the first big coal miners' strike in 1893 led to the largest disruption of
energy supply in three hundred years. Subsequently, the strikes in
1921 and 1926 also led to strong shortages (Church, 1865). In 1984,
when the economywas dependent on oil for transportation and natural
gas for heating, the coal strike had a substantially weaker impact, but
still influenced average energy prices, as coal generated most of the
UK's power. Meanwhile, the oil crises associated with unrest in the
Middle-East led to an important one in 1974 and, in 1980, the second
largest supply shock in more than three hundred years.
Aggregate demand shocks were driven by completely different fac-
tors. Indeed, the type of energy source used did not matter much for
the existence of aggregate demand shocks, although which energy
source used might determine whether the aggregate demand shock
fed through into a price increase. Instead, the state of the economy
was the driver of these shocks.
Significant demand shocks were observed in times of warfare, as
they generated unusual and intensified demands for energy (see
Table 4). Thewars that had themost significant effects on aggregate de-
mandwere theWar of Spanish Succession (especially, 1704–5) and the
Second World War (here, 1943–4). The Seven Years' War in combina-
tion with three simultanuous colonian wars against France (in North-
America, India & Ghana) in 1757, the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, the
second Boer War in 1900 and the First World War (particularly 1915)
also appear to have been important (see also Fig. 2). Therewere also pe-
riods of civilian economic growth that fed through into pressures onshock shock shock
Energy production − +/− +
Economic activity +/− + −
Energy price + +
➢ P12
+
➢ P13
Fig. 2. Energy price shocks by factor (1700–2010).
210 D.J. van de Ven, R. Fouquet / Energy Economics 62 (2017) 204–216resources, ‘overheating’ and increasing energy prices, culminating in
economic downturns, often coinciding with financial crisis (1873,
1980 and 2008).
Finally, residual shocks are estimated as the change in price not ex-
plained by changing supply or aggregate demand. Often, these are de-
scribed as shocks associated with precautionary demand in which
consumers or speculators hoard energy in the anticipation of future
supply shortages (Kilian, 2008). Major positive and negative residual
shocks generally coincide with supply or aggregate demand shocks.
This indicates that they do reflect some form of extended reaction to
other ‘fundamental’ shocks.
5. The trends in shock effects
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic effects of ener-
gy price shocks from a long-term perspective. As these energy price
shocks can be caused by different factors (i.e. energy supply, aggregated
demand or speculation) and since GDP responds differently depending
on the mechanism behind the shock, we chose to analyse the economic
effects by breaking down the energy price shocks into three different
types, as explained in the previous section.
5.1. Influence of shocks on prices
Fig. 4 presents the average values (for the full period of 310 years) of
the immediate and lagged response of energy prices to each of the aver-
age shocks, using least-squares methods, presented in Section 4.2. It
shows that the immediate response of energy prices to all three shocks
is similar.13 That is, there is an initially large response to the shock and13 Section 3.1 explained that, for the price series used in the model, we weighted the
prices by the percentage of energy expenditures in total GDP. While this is a necessary
condition inside the model to estimate the shocks correctly, this method causes a some-
what misleading series of energy price changes: the positive and negative effects of de-
mand shocks on energy prices are strongly overestimated, since increased consumption
leads to rising energy prices and weights of these prices. On the other hand, if price in-
creases due to supply shocks are followed by a strong decline in energy consumption
(which occurs in many cases throughout the time series), this also decreases the weight
of energy prices, dampening these price increases. Therefore, weighting the price changes
on energy expenditures strongly underestimates the effects of supply shocks. Since we
want to see the effects of shocks on actual changes in energy prices rather than on those
influenced by the consumption level, we used unweighted real energy price changes as
an dependent variable in the regression of shocks on energy prices.then, in later years, some response in the opposite direction. In other
words, for all shocks, there tends to be overshooting or correction to
the shock in the first period.
While this average graph shows the result over a total period of
310 years, we are interested in how this response changed over time.
To analyse that, we performed similar estimates for every set of shocks
identified by the same shockmatrix (see Section 4.1). The final estimate
of the response of UK energy prices to shocks in a particular year will be
the 60-year moving average (i.e., the average of all responses estimated
where that yearwas included— see Fouquet and Pearson, 2012). All the
results were estimated using the least-squares method, and the stan-
dard deviations resulting from the same method.14 We used periods
of 60 years as it seemed to be the optimal length to ensure both a high
flexibility in the resulting point estimates and low uncertainty levels.15
Fig. 5 shows the resulting moving average of the effect of shocks to
energy prices. These results represent the sum of the immediate impact
and the three lags following these shocks (see Fig. 4). Interestingly, sup-
ply shocks tended to have lower impacts on energy prices during tran-
sition periods (1780–1830 for biomass to coal and 1900–1940 for coal
to petroleum) compared with periods during which the energy mix
was dominated by a single source of energy (1830–1900 for coal and
1940–2010 for petroleum, see Fig. 3). This effect indicates that realistic
opportunities of energy switching have a stabilizing effect on the re-
sponse of energy prices to events that disrupt supply of the initially
dominant energy source.
The immediate impact of aggregate demand shocks declined strong-
ly from 6% around 1700 to 3% in the early twentieth century, and has
been relatively stable since then. This decline during the transition of
biomass to fossil fuels suggests that fossil fuel (i.e., coal and later oil
and gas) producers could respond more easily to a sudden increase in
demand than farmers, toning-down the final effect on energy prices.
Fig. 6 combines the estimated shocks (Fig. 2) and their period-
dependent effects on energy prices (Fig. 5) to give an indication of the
causes of energy price fluctuations since 1700. The figure shows that14 As the results are presented as the sum of the effect over several years, we used the
standard deviation of the immediate response as the standard deviation for this sum, as
this generally has the largest standard deviation. In the few cases that the lags have higher
standard deviations, we use the average standard deviation of the lags.
15 Robustness checks of these estimates with respect to the choice of the median shock
identification matrices can be found in Table B1 in Appendix B.
Fig. 3. Share of primary energy expenditure in the United Kingdom (1700–2010).
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oil crises), the volatility of energy prices declined significantly over time.
In the eighteenth century, shocks causing a 10% increase or decrease of
energy priceswere frequent. After the 1920s, such shockswere rare. De-
clining prices in the 1950s and 1960s were driven by excess supply.
However, the energy supply shocks in the 1970s and 2000s occurred si-
multaneously with aggregate demand shocks, causing strong price
shocks when adding up both effects, confirming Kilian's (2008) results.5.2. Influence of shocks on GDP
The final purpose of the shock identification method is to estimate
the changing impact of different shocks on GDP. As Kilian (2008) has
shown, supply and aggregate demand shocks are likely to impact GDP
differently. Before investigating the changing impacts, to show the ef-
fects of different shocks, we ran a static linear regression of the average
shocks and their 3-year lags on GDP over the entire 310-year period
(see Fig. 7). As with the regression on energy prices (see Fig. 4), both
means and confidence intervals are estimated using least-squares
methods.
Fig. 7 confirms our expectations that the immediate response of GDP
on aggregate demand shocks has been significantly positive,while it has
been negative for supply shocks. The corrective effects of GDP from all
shocks are much stronger than for energy prices in Fig. 4: for both sup-
ply and demand shocks, the sum of the lags generated slightly negative
values; for residual shocks, they were positive.
For supply shocks, themajority of the negative immediate impact on
GDP has been offset by a positive corrective effect during the first year
following the shock. A supply shock (leading to a price increase) can
be seen as a temporary adverse technology shock, reducing the amountTable 3
Energy supply shocks and probable causes for these shocks.
Supply shocks Probable cause
1710, 1731, 1740 Agricultural reasons / crop failures
1893, 1921, 1926, 1984 Coal miners' strikes
1974, 1980 Oil crises
Source: Authors' estimates.of capital utilization (Finn, 2000). According to this theory of supply
shocks, once the shock ends, capital utilization can return to its earlier
level and so does GDP.
For aggregate demand shocks, the positive impact during the year of
the shock led to a longer lasting negative corrective effect. However, one
should take care in interpreting this result: as an aggregate demand
shock is measured by an increase in energy prices that coincided with
a business cycle peak, such a peak year in the business cycle was inevi-
tably followed by a decline, so the response of GDP to aggregate demand
shocks in Fig. 7 is partly a self fulfilling prophecy16.
The response to residual shocks is also interesting: while Fig. 4 indi-
cates that the corrective effect of energy prices after a residual shock
was relatively low, Fig. 7 shows that the corrective effect of GDPwas re-
markably high and long-lasting. There are two possible explanations for
this high corrective rate of GDP after a residual shock. First, in many
cases, a residual shock represents the amount of overshooting in the re-
sponse to supply and aggregate demand shocks. As it occurred in paral-
lel with both kinds of shocks, a regression would typically estimate the
impact in association with the effects of both supply and demand
shocks. However, a price-induced technical efficiency improvement
might be largely represented by a positive residual effect. Second, resid-
ual shocks might include any effects that could increase energy prices
apart from the effect of supply and aggregate demand. An energy switch
that uses a different technology, say, might have an increasing effect on
energy prices, but might have a positive long term effect on GDP as the
new technology becaomes more efficient or yields other qualitative
advantages.
Themore central question, however, is how the effects of supply and
demand shocks changed over time. Fig. 8 shows the change of this effect
over time, separately for the immediate and the lagged response (sum
of the three lags, see Fig. 7) of either supply and aggregate demand
shocks. Both the point estimates and the confidence intervals are calcu-
lated using the same method as used for energy prices (see Fig. 5)17.16 The same effect would apply in Kilian (2008) as the aggregate demand indicator also
measured the global business cycle using dry cargo shipping rates.
17 Robustness checks of these estimates with respect to the choice of the median shock
identification matrices can be found in Table B2 in Appendix B.
Table 4
Aggregate demand shocks and probable causes for these shocks.
Aggregate demand shocks Probable cause
1704–5, 1757, 1815, 1900, 1915, 1943–4 Warfare
1873, 1980, 2008 Strong economic growth
Source: see text above.
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vulnerability) decreased strongly (in absolute terms; i.e. became less
negative) during the first half or our time-series, when the dominance
of agricultural products in the energy mix declined rapidly. It then in-
creased until 1925 with the rapid transition to domestically produced
coal and decreased again with the transition towards imported petro-
leum. This decreased impact has continued into the twenty-first century,
supporting the observation made by Dhawan and Jeske (2006) and
Kilian (2008) that immediate impacts of oil price shocks has decreased
during the last decades. However, these results place their observations
within a broader historical trend of increased immediate impacts during
the Second Industrial Revolution (1870–1913) as the economy became
increasingly dependent on coal for all economic activities and energy
services, such as heating, power and transportation.
In broad terms, the corrective or lagged effect (i.e., resilience) of GDP
to supply shocks mirrored the immediate effects. While the immediate
effects followed an-inverse S-shape curve rotated 90° anti-clockwise,
the lagged effects displayed a S-shape curve rotated 90° anti-
clockwise. Thus, in general, the lagged effects of supply shocks seem
to largely offset the immediate effect.
However, at specific times, these lagged effects did not mirror the im-
mediate effects, leading to significant changes in total effects. For instance,
the lagged effects declined at first rapidly thenmore gradually until 1830.
Around 1850, they increased faster than the immediate effects implying
that the total effects of supply shocks were negligible. Thus, the economy
becamemore resilient to supply shockswith the early transition frombio-
mass energy to coal during the third-quarter of the nineteenth century.
However, its resilience to supply shocks appears to have decreased
strongly with the increasing dependence on coal energy from the
1880s, partly supporting Jevons' (1865) hypothesis that increasing de-
pendence of the British economyon coal energywouldfinally have a neg-
ative influence on economic growth due to the rising scarcity and costs of
coal.
Just aswas done for energy prices (i.e., by summing up the responses
of the four estimated lags), Fig. 9 presents the moving average of the
total effect that the three different shocks had on GDP from 1700 to
2010. This figure shows the change in the total effect of supply shocks
on GDP since 1700. The effect can be characterized as a W-shapeFig. 4. Immediate and lagged responses of energy prices in the United Kingdom to shocks
of one standard deviation (average over 1700–2010).curve: the negative impact increased (in absolute terms) during the
eighteenth century, became weaker during the the nineteenth century
(with no estimated effect between 1870 and 1890), then it strength-
ened and, around 1940, it weakened again.
The total impact of aggregate demand shocks on GDP fluctuated
around−0.5 until the mid-nineteenth century. The lagged negative ef-
fects (mostly associated wth the resource scarcity implications of an
overheating economy) were a little greater (in absolute terms) than
the immediate beneficial effects (see Fig. 8). However, from the 1870s,
the rapid expansion of coal exports to Europe strengthened the imme-
diate positive effect of demand shocks to GDP, while the transition
from an agricultural to a fossil fuel based economy weakened the
long-term negative effects caused by an ‘overheating’ economy.
From the 1920s, declining coal exports and strongly increasing de-
pendence on imported petroleum implied that energy prices were in-
creasingly impacted by global instead of national demand shocks,
while the profits of higher energy prices started to flow out instead of
into the UK. This increasing mismatch between the UK business cycle
and demand-related energy price shocks caused the immediate positive
effect of demand shocks onGDP to decrease. This decreasing response of
GDP to aggregate demand shocks might, therefore, be partly or
completely caused by a shift in the relevant real activity (see explana-
tion in Section 3.3). Although this might be interesting by itself, such
as when energy markets became more international, this also created
a larger mismatch between domestic business cycle peaks and high en-
ergy prices caused by international business cycle peaks, making these
shocks economically more painful.
For residual shocks, for which the positive effects on GDP seem to be
strongly related with the share of coal exports from the UK, this evolu-
tion is almost completely driven by the variation of the positive lagged
response of GDP to residual shocks. The explanation of the evolution
of the residual shock seems obvious. Throughout the majority of the
sample, residual shocks tend to represent some mix of amplified reac-
tions of energy prices to supply and demand shocks. Therefore, the ex-
pected effect on GDP is slightly positive, representing the positive
effects that energy prices might have on investment in energy efficient
technology. However, in a ceteris paribus situation, an increase in ener-
gy prices would always positively affect GDP of an energy exporting
country. Therefore, the boost in coal exports from the UK, peaking in
the early twentieth century, is represented by an increased positive cor-
relation between energy prices and GDP growth.
Finally, as a general point, there was a significant decrease in the ac-
tual impact caused by energy price shocks on GDP since the Second
WorldWar (See Fig. 10). However, themajor force behind this decrease
seems to be smaller shocks (see Fig. 2) rather than particularly declining
impacts to energy price shocks (see Figs. 8 and 9).
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the effects of energy price
shocks on GDP at different phases of economic development, by
analysing United Kingdom data over the last three hundred years. To
perform such an analysis, the method proposed by Kilian (2008) and
developed further in Kilian andMurphy (2012)was used to disentangle
supply, aggregate demand and residual shocks. For the method to be
more suitable for long-term annual time series, we identified shocks
using a moving average of the identification matrices. The average
shocks were identified and discussed in the context of historical events,
such as poor harvests, miners' strikes or wars, and the time-specific
shocks were used as explanatory variables in influencing variation in
real energy prices and GDP.
The results showed that therewas considerable change in the effects
of shocks on GDP over the past three hundred years (see Fig. 9). The
economy experienced a decline in the total impact from supply shocks
associated with early industrialisation and the transition to coal. In
fact, the results suggest that, between 1800 and 1870, the total impact
Fig. 5. Accumulated response of United Kingdom energy prices to shocks, with 95% confidence intervals (1700–2010).
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ate impact of supply shocks (see Fig. 8). However, from the 1870s, the
economy's immediate impact to supply shocks increased strongly.
Then, from the 1920s, these immediate impacts appear to have started
to decrease. This supports the Dhawan and Jeske (2006) and Kilian
(2008) conclusions that the impacts of energy supply shocks have
been decreasing since the transition to petroleum and places them
within a broader historical trend.
Similarly, the negative total impact of aggregate demand shocks
on GDP growth rates declined during the nineteenth century (as
the economy industrialized and completed the transition to coal)
and demand shocks became even positive when coal exports to
Europe peaked in the early twentieth century. However, the econo-
my appears to have become more sensitive with the transition to
oil in the mid-twentieth century (see Fig. 9). In general, this type ofFig. 6. United Kingdom energy price variation explained by supply, aggregashock could be interpreted as a cost of the economy accelerating
too quickly and overheating. With the transition to oil, the
overheating was experienced at an increasingly global level and,
therefore, there was a decline in the immediate positive gains to
the domestic economy (see Fig. 8).
One possible explanation for this change in sensitivity to supply and
demand shocks could be associatedwith price elasticities of demand for
energy and energy services. Fouquet and Pearson (1998) shows that
there was a general increase (in absolute terms) in price elasticities of
demand for energy services until the 1870s, followed by a decline
until the 1920s and relatively stable elasticities since then. Higher
price elasticities in the nineteenth century implies that consumers had
higher substitution effects and/or higher income effects, and an ability
to adjust to higher prices. Especially during the accelerated transition
to coal in the late ninetheenth century, price elasticities decreasedte demand and residual/residual shocks, 3-year average (1700–2010).
Fig. 7. Immediate and lagged responses to shocks of one standard deviation on United
Kingdom GDP (average over 1700–2010).
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nerable to price shocks.
More generally, however, the major reason why the economy has
been less affected by supply and demand shocks since Second World
War is simply that, apart from the price hike in 1980 andmoremodestly
between 2006 and 2008, the shocks themselves have decreased signifi-
cantly in strength (see Figs. 2 and 10).
The most straightforward reason why shocks could have decreased
significantly in strength since the Second World War is that the scale of
energy markets has increased significantly since then. Decreasing ship-
ping prices and global trade agreements implied that energy commodi-
ties have been traded on a rapidly increasing scale since the end of the
Second World War. Disruptive local events that would significantly im-
pact energy prices in a situation with isolated markets will be easily
dampened in a global market. Indeed, prior to the Second World War,
badharvests, coalminer strikes and regional conflicts causedmajor ener-
gy price shocks. However, the only events that caused significant shocks
in UK energy prices after the Second World War were important global
events, such as tensions and wars specifically in the region that suppliedFig. 8. Immediate and lagged response of United Kingdom GDmost the world's exported oil (1973/74 and 1979/80) and an unprece-
dented rapid increase in the global economy (2002–2008).
Compared to Kilian (2009), this study found, over the entire period,
a similar immediate impact and corrective effect from supply shocks to
GDP (see Fig. 7). The average negative lagged effects of demand shocks
caused by an ‘overheating’ economy were weaker than Kilian's esti-
mates, although our estimates come close to those of Kilian during the
later subset of our sample (see Fig. 8). For residual shocks, our results
show opposite effects to the oil-market specific demand shocks pre-
sented by Kilian's (2009) study. Compared to Kilian's estimates, our
resulting effects of shocks on energy prices tend to be significantly
stronger for supply shocks while weaker for demand shocks. An impor-
tant difference, however, is that Kilian used weighted energy prices for
this analysis, while we used unweighted energy prices as we think that
weighting energy prices by expenditures underestimated the true ef-
fects that supply disruptions have on the real price of energy, while
overestimating the true effects of increased demand for energy.
The consequence of analysing the effects over this long timespan
is that it was necessary to use annual data, while the methodology
was initially designed for monthly data. Although a combination of
a sign-identification matrix and supply elasticity bounds was used
to overcome the problem of a biased identification of the different
shocks (similar to Kilian and Murphy, 2012), it was inevitable that
the resulting shocks were less ‘pure’ than those identified from
monthly data. Also, using the median matrix from the set of admissi-
ble shock matrices was not theoretically correct, since the method
imposed that every admissible shock matrix was equally likely. It is
hoped that the reader will also agree with the authors that the
benefits gained from this historical perspective outweigh these
limitations.
Altogether, the analysis offers novel findings about the effects of
energy price shocks. As current literature has only focused on the
post-Second World War period and usually only on oil, this paper
puts those results in a broader and historical perspective. Indeed,
the results indicate that resilience of the British economy to shocks
has changed following energy transitions, but does not appear to
have been systematically improved by economic development. The
trend of decreasing energy price shocks since 1948 has created an il-
lusion of increasing resilience of the British economy (as shown in
Figs. 2 and 10).P to shocks, with 95% confidence intervals (1700–2010).
Fig. 9. Accumulated response of United Kingdom GDP to shocks (1700–2010).
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ments in the natural gas may further decrease the probability of large
energy price shocks. However, this development increases the vulnera-
bility of every individual economy to non-domestic macroeconomic
events such as the economic boom in 2002–2008 that caused energy
prices to increase to levels unprecendented in the last century (see
Fig. 1). On the other hand, a transition towards renewable energy may
reverse this trend, and care should be taken to learn from the lessons
from earlier periods – in particular, that integrating individual national
markets can dampen volatility, ensure a mix of energy sources and
avoid overheating the economy.
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the results - that vul-
nerability and resilience to energy price shocks are related to energymar-
kets rather than economic development - is that developing countriesFig. 10. United Kingdom GDP variation explained by supply anthat depend on globally traded energy resources should not expect to be-
comemore resilient to energy price shocks over time. Instead, the highest
resilience against energy price shocks was observed between 1850 and
1880when the British economydepended on a diversifiedmix of domes-
tically produced energy sources (coal, provender andwood). Such an en-
ergymix implies that the impact of supply shockswas limited due to high
substitutability between energy sources, whereas the negative impacts of
aggregate demand shocks were offset by the positive impacts of a grow-
ing economy (that caused the shock). If this conclusion can be applied
to the future, then, particularly during a transition to renewable energy
sources, economies will become less vulnerable andmore resilient to en-
ergy price shocks. Future research should investigate in more detail the
changing vulnerabilities and resiliences associated with the transitions
to low carbon economies to confirm this hypothesis.d aggregate demand shocks, 3-year average (1700–2010).
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
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